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compared to heavy-tailed claims previously studied in the literature.
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1 Introduction
By monitoring a financial system a CEO (regulator) should assess risk exposures
of business lines or single companies in order to determine capital reserves required
in case of unexpected large losses. A regulator’s assessment requires the following
information: What are the individual agent’s risks for large exposures? Which are
the dominant objects able to cause serious losses to agents or to the entire system?
How does the system structure affect the relationship between individual risks and
the system risk? We contribute to the current literature by exploring all these issues
for light-tailed exponentially distributed losses, which are of particular relevance for
standard insurance claims and further related applications (cf. Embrechts et al. [5]).
We consider a system of risky objects which are hold by economic agents forming a
financial network. This setting can be illustrated by a bipartite graph of agent-object
relationships as shown in Figure 1.1. In this paper, we focus primarily on agents
holding various claims in their portfolios and the corresponding risks. As many
insurance companies and investment funds hold portfolios with risky claims which
may cause critical losses, these issues should be studied in a network context. In
particular, it is of importance to investigate consequences of losses for both individual
agents and the system as well as to compute the corresponding conditional and
unconditional loss probabilities. Such results are of special interest for various types
of regulating authorities, which should facilitate stability monitoring for both the
system and agents. In this context the analysis of portfolio diversification benefits is
of relevance for quantifying individual and system risks; cf. Geluk et al. [8], Ibragimov
[10], Mainik and Ru¨schendorf [20], Pe´rignon and Smith [25].
The effects of risk aggregation and risk sharing have been studied in the current
literature mainly for heavy-tailed claims with a power decay in their tails; see Em-
brechts et al. [6], Kley et al. [15], Ly Vath et al. [19], Lin et al. [18], Xia [26] among
others. Light-tailed distributions, however, provide a suitable description of many
risks faced by financial institutions or insurance companies, as it is shown e.g. by As-
mussen and Albrecher [2], Herna´ndez and Junca [9], Kaas et al. [14], Kyprianou [17]
for the insurance context and by Andersen et al. [1] with examples in the financial
context. In particular, the exponential distribution is rather convenient as it allows
for the derivation of important results in an explicit form. Moreover, it can often
be extended to more general distribution families, such as referring to the Gumbel
max-domain of attraction (cf. Mitra and Resnick [24]) or to the Crame´r-Lundberg
class for ruin estimates (cf. Asmussen and Albrecher [2]).
Currently, there are only a few stochastic results on aggregating and sharing losses
with light-tailed distributions. Jiang and Tang [13] study the asymptotic behavior of
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Figure 1.1: The risk sharing structure as a bipartite graph for a system of 4 objects with claims Vj
hold by 6 agents with exposures Ui. The portfolio weights are ai,j for agents i ∈ {1, . . . , 6} and
objects j ∈ {1, . . . , 4}.
reinsured losses in a setting of independently and identically distributed exponential
claims. Since in their paper all claims have the same parameter λ, the aggregated
claim (system risk) follows an Erlang distribution. Mitra and Resnick [24] analyze
the aggregation X + Y for claims X, Y with tail-equivalent distributions in the
Gumbel max-domain of attraction, which contains the exponential, Gaussian, and
log-normal distributions as specific examples. They assume a certain dependence
structure between X and Y , which results in their asymptotic independence. Farkas
and Hashorva [7] consider two portfolios of Gaussian-like risks and derive limit results
for the distribution of portfolio losses. The asymptotic results for optimal allocation
problems for exponential claims are obtained in Maume-Deschamps et al. [22] as the
capital size goes to infinity. However, none of these papers consider consequences of
risk sharing in the context of network or system risks.
In this paper we contribute to the current research by studying independent expo-
nential claims on risky objects with distinct tail decays in the context of risk sharing
with a bipartite graph representation. Our framework is rather general and flexible.
We allow for different risk classes modelled by distinct exponential parameters which
is a generalization compared to Jiang and Tang [13], Kley et al. [15, 16] and Mitra
and Resnick [24], who assume tail-equivalent risks for either light- or heavy-tailed
claims. In our setting, the agents may form their portfolios by holding selected claims
with different proportions. This implies that the agents’ risks as well as the risk of the
whole system follow “generalized exponential mixture” distributions; cf. Jasiulewicz
and Kordecki [11] and Jewell [12].
Our analysis provides novel results concerning conditional survival functions of the
type P (L1 > l1 | L2 > l2) where Li, i = 1, 2 denote losses either of specific ob-
jects, or of individual agents, or of the entire system. Thereby, we obtain statements
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both for the exact conditional distributions with finite threshold values li and for
the asymptotic tail behavior with li → ∞. That is, we provide expressions for un-
conditional and conditional tail probabilities as they contain the information about
extreme situations which are of most importance in practice. As the class of gener-
alized exponential mixture distributions has not been investigated with respect to
their conditional distributions up to now, our findings contribute to their statistical
theory. Our results also could be used for computing standard risk measures like
Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall.
We start our discussion by deriving the survival functions for both single agent’s and
system’s losses. The important result is given in Theorem 3.5 where we show that
the dominant impact on both individual and system risks is determined by single
distinct objects and that generically the risk-dominant objects for the system do not
coincide with those for individual agents. We provide an economic explanation for
this interesting phenomenon in Remark 3.6.
In Theorems 4.1 and 4.6 we deduce both exact and asymptotic results for the condi-
tional distributions of agents’ and system’s losses given that an object claim exceeds
a certain threshold value. We show that these conditional distributions do not de-
pend on which object causes this large claim, which is of importance for applications.
Both mathematical and economic interpretations of our results are provided in Re-
marks 4.2 and 4.7, respectively. There we point out that the impact of a large claim
on individual or system’s losses can be completely quantified solely by their marginal
distributions, which implies a substantial policy simplification from the regulator’s
point of view.
Furthermore, we analyze interdependencies between individual and system risks, in
particular for agents with different degrees of portfolio diversification; our results of
Theorem 5.1, Proposition 5.2, and Corollaries 5.3 – 5.6 are interpreted in Remark 5.7.
Moreover, we introduce in Theorem 5.8 a criterion to decide in view of systemic
crisis situations, when it is beneficial for agents to concentrate on a few objects or
to diversify.
Finally, we provide a detailed comparison of our results for systems with exponen-
tial claims to the corresponding results in heavy-tailed settings. We point out the
substantial differences between these two settings; e.g., we show that diversifica-
tion works rather different for exponential claims compared to heavy-tailed (Pareto)
claims.
Our paper is organized as follows. After describing our framework with relevant
assumptions in Section 2, we derive in Section 3 the marginal distributions of indi-
vidual risks as well as of the system risk. In Section 4 we study the impact of large
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claims on the system’s and the agents’ losses. In Section 5.1 we analyze the interrela-
tion between individual and system risks, which is of a special importance for system
regulation. In Section 5.2 we discuss diversification effects for agents’ portfolios in
the context of systemic crises. In Section 6 we summarize our findings and compare
our results for light tails with those established for heavy-tailed models. The proofs
of Theorem 4.1 and 5.1 are postponed to Section 7, whereas the other proofs are
placed immediately after the statements.
2 Model framework: notions and notations
In this section we formalize the framework for our investigation. We analyze systems
which consist of d objects and n agents for some positive integers d and n; the
objects j ∈ d := {1, . . . , d} cause claims of size Vj > 0 which are shared among the
agents such that the portfolio loss
Ui =
d∑
j=1
ai,j Vj , i ∈ n := {1, . . . , n} , (2.1)
expresses the risk exposure of agent i. Moreover, the system’s loss is denoted as
S =
d∑
j=1
Vj . (2.2)
The portfolio weights are collected into (n×d)-dimensional matrix A = (ai,j)i∈n,j∈d,
which is the weighted adjacency matrix to the bipartite graph. Each component of A
as well as the column-sums of A have to be less or equal to 1; i.e.,
0 ≤ ai,j ≤ 1 for all i ∈ n, j ∈ d ;
∑
i∈n
ai,j ≤ 1 for all j ∈ d . (2.3)
The boundary value 1 corresponds to the case that the risk for the object j is
covered in total. We assume the matrix A and, consequently, the bipartite graph to
be deterministic.
Throughout this paper, we meet the following two assumptions:
Assumption 1 The claims Vj are stochastically independent and exponentially dis-
tributed with parameters λ˜j > 0 for j ∈ d. Hence, the claim Vj has the density
fVj (x) = λ˜j exp(−λ˜jx) for x > 0.
Further, let
M(i) := {j ∈ d | ai,j > 0} (2.4)
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be the set of indices from all objects selected by agent i ∈ n, then Ui can be repre-
sented as the sum
∑
j∈M(i) Xi,j of independent exponentially distributed Xi,j with
parameters
λi,j := λ˜j/ai,j . (2.5)
Assumption 2 For all i ∈ n, k, j ∈ d with k 6= j we require that λ˜k 6= λ˜j and
λi,k 6= λi,j .
This assumption ensures that the parameters of the exponential distributions are
pairwise distinct, both of the claims Vj and of the weighted claims ai,jVj . This
assumption is commonly met for the analysis of generalized exponential mixtures
(see e.g. Bergel and Eg´ıdio dos Reis [3], McLachlan [23]). In Remark 3.7(ii) we
show how to handle the case where the restriction for pairwise distinct parameters
is removed.
Notations and conventions. Two functions f and g are said to be asymptotically
equivalent (we write f ∼ g) if f(x)/g(x)→ 1 for x→∞ and proportional (we write
f ∝ g) if f(x)/g(x) = c for some constant c > 0. Further, we denote by |M | the
cardinality of a set M .
The smallest parameters will play an important role for the risk-dominant terms, so
that we define their values and the corresponding indices as
`(i) := λi,m(i) := min
j∈M(i)
λi,j , (2.6)
˜` := λ˜m˜ := min
j∈d
λ˜j . (2.7)
For a reader’s convenience, we distinguish quantities corresponding to the system
from quantities corresponding to agents by a tilde. The following table summarizes
our notation.
system agent definition
parameters: λ˜j , ˜` λi,j , `(i) Assumpt. 1, Eqs. (2.5) – (2.7)
object indices
(subset of d):
m˜ m(i), M(i) Eqs. (2.4), (2.6), (2.7)
mixing proportions: p˜ij pii,j Eqs. (3.2), (3.5) below
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3 Individual and system risks
In this section we investigate the unconditional distributions of individual agents’
risks as well as that of the system risk. After providing the exact results, we deduce
their characteristic tail behavior.
Consider an arbitrary agent i which selects objects Vj for j ∈M(i) as defined in (2.1)
and (2.4).
Proposition 3.1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the exposure Ui of agent i ∈ n has
density
fUi(x) =
∑
j∈M(i)
pii,jλi,j exp(−λi,j x) , x > 0 , (3.1)
with mixing proportions
pii,j :=

∏
k∈M(i)\{j}
λi,k
λi,k − λi,j for |M(i)| > 1 ,
1 otherwise .
(3.2)
The distributional form (3.1) can be deduced analogously to Jasiulewicz and Ko-
rdecki [11, Th. 1] by applying Laplace transformations. From integration of (3.1) it
follows that the mixing proportions sum up to one:
∑
j∈M(i)
pii,j = 1 , (3.3)
where b|M(i)|/2c of the |M(i)| mixing proportions are negative. Then the exposure Ui
with density (3.1) is said to follow a generalized exponential mixture (GEM) distri-
bution; see Mathai [21]. This distribution class is also known in the literature as
“generalized Erlang”, see e.g. Bergel and Eg´ıdio dos Reis [3].
Remark 3.2. The mixing proportions alternate in sign: If the weighted claimsXi,j =
ai,jVj are put (without loss of generality) in ascended order, i.e. λi,1 < λi,2 < · · · <
λi,|M(i)|, then pii,j is positive for uneven indices j and negative for even indices, as
pii,j has exactly (j − 1) negative factors in the denominator of (3.2). ♦
An illustration is given by the following simple example.
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Example 3.3. Let some agent i have exactly two objects 1 and 2 in the portfolio.
With Xi,j := ai,jVj we obtain:
fUi(x) =
x∫
0
fXi,1(x− u)fXi,2(u)du
= λi,1λi,2 exp(−λi,1x)
x∫
0
exp((λi,1 − λi,2)u)du
=
λi,2
λi,2 − λi,1 fXi,1(x)−
λi,1
λi,2 − λi,1 fXi,2(x) =
2∑
j=1
pii,jfXi,j (x) , x > 0 ,
hence, one of the mixing proportions is positive and the other one is negative. ♦
Next we consider the risk of the entire system, which is defined as the aggregation
of all claims S =
∑d
j=1 Vj . It follows a GEM distribution as well:
Corollary 3.4. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the system risk S has density:
fS(x) =
d∑
j=1
p˜ijfVj (x) =
d∑
j=1
p˜ij λ˜j exp(−λ˜jx) , x > 0 , (3.4)
with mixing proportions
p˜ij :=

∏
k∈d\{j}
λ˜k
λ˜k − λ˜j
for d > 1 ,
1 otherwise .
(3.5)
These mixing proportions p˜ij satisfy properties analogously to those of pii,j for indi-
vidual agents as described above.
In the following theorem we state an important result characterizing our framework
with exponential claims. It gives the asymptotic behavior of individual and system
risks for large losses and points out their different tail behavior. More precisely, it
shows that the claim with the smallest parameter, see (2.6) and (2.7), determines
the asymptotics:
Theorem 3.5. Under Assumptions 1 and 2 the survival functions satisfy:
(i) for individual risk of agent i ∈ n :
P (Ui > x) =
∑
j∈M(i)
pii,j exp(−λi,j x) , x > 0 ,
∼ pii,m(i) exp(−`(i)x) ∝ P (ai,m(i) Vm(i) > x) for x→∞ ;
8
(ii) for system risk:
P (S > x) =
d∑
j=1
p˜ijP (Vj > x) =
d∑
j=1
p˜ij exp(−λ˜jx) , x > 0 ,
∼ p˜im˜ exp(−˜`x) ∝ P (Vm˜ > x) for x→∞ .
Theorem 3.5 is interpreted in the following Remark 3.6 and illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Remark 3.6.
(i) Both system risk S and individual risk Ui of agent i have asymptotically ex-
ponential tails, but with different tail decays. The survival function of the
system risk is asymptotically proportional to that of the claim Vm˜ with the
smallest value of the parameters λ˜j , i.e. m˜ = k for λ˜k = min(λ˜j). In contrast,
the survival function of the individual risk Ui is determined asymptotically
by the claim which – dependent on parameters λ˜j and scaled by the portfolio
weights ai,j – takes the minimal value among all λi,j = λ˜j/ai,j for j ∈M(i) (all
claims in the portfolio of agent i).
(ii) Due to the different tail decays, generically the individual risks are asymptot-
ically negligible with respect to the system risk:
P (Ui > x) = o(P (S > x)) for x→∞
for all i ∈ n, except for the special case that agent i selects the most risky
object j alone; i.e., when ai,m˜ = 1.
♦
Remark 3.7. Here we comment on the case of dropping Assumption 2, which
implies a possibility of equal parameters for some (or all) claims. Then the following
would hold:
(i) The parameters λi,j may coincide for different j-values and, hence, the distri-
bution of individual exposure Ui is not GEM any longer. If – as a special case
– all λi,j for j ∈ M(i) coincide, then Ui is Erlang distributed. In general, if
only some λi,j coincide, Ui follows a generalized Erlang mixture distribution,
cf. Jasiulewicz and Kordecki [11]. This applies for the system’s loss S as well.
(ii) The corresponding results of Proposition 3.1 and Corollary 3.4 for λi,k = λi,j
(or λ˜k = λ˜j) can be obtained as limits λi,k → λi,j (or λ˜k → λ˜j). Consider
9
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Figure 3.1: (a): Survival functions for d = 10 objects having exponentially distributed claim
sizes with equidistant parameters λ˜1 = 0.1, λ˜2 = 0.2, . . . , λ˜10 = 1.0 (solid lines), and the function
x 7→ p˜im˜ exp(−˜`x) (dotted line) as an approximation of system P (S > x) (dashed line); cf. Theo-
rem 3.5.
(b): Same functions as in (a) with a logarithmic y-axis to illustrate that parameter l˜ of the approx-
imating function coincides with parameter λ˜1 of the dominant object claim Vm˜ = V1 (dotted line
and bold solid line).
Example 3.3, where taking such limit leads to an Erlang distribution:
lim
λi,2→λi,1
P (Ui > x) = lim
λi,2→λi,1
λi,2 exp(−λi,1x)− λi,1 exp(−λi,2x)
λi,2 − λi,1
= lim
λi,2→λi,1
(exp(−λi,1x) + λi,1x exp(−λi,2x))
= (1 + λi,1x) exp(−λi,1x) , x > 0 .
The asymptotic results in Theorem 3.5 give Erlang tails of order q, where q is
the number of asymptotically dominant claims with the smallest parameters;
i.e., for statements (i) and (ii) we have q = |{j ∈M(i) | λi,j = mink∈M(i) λi,k}|
or q = |{j ∈ d | λ˜j = mink∈d λ˜k}|, respectively. ♦
4 Conditional results on agents’ and system losses given
large claims
In this section we investigate the conditional distributions for the system risk S
and for an arbitrary agent’s risk Ui given that an object causes a large claim. More
precisely, we derive the conditional survival functions and densities of S and Ui given
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that a claim Vj exceeds a certain threshold and, conversely, those of Vj given that
S or Ui exceeds some threshold.
In the following theorem we deduce a characteristic property which illustrates the
influence of a large object’s loss on the system risk. Hereafter we exclude trivial cases
where the corresponding conditional probability is equal to 1, e.g. in the following
theorem we only consider s > v and α > 1.
Theorem 4.1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the conditional probabilities for system
risk S from (2.2) satisfy for claim Vj, j ∈ d:
(i) for s > v > 0:
P (S > s | Vj > v) = P (S > s− v) =
d∑
k=1
p˜ik exp(−λ˜k(s− v)) ;
(ii) asymptotically for x→∞ and α > 1:
P (S > αx | Vj > x) ∼ p˜im˜ exp(−(α− 1)˜`x) ∝ P (Vm˜ > (α− 1)x) ,
with m˜ and ˜` from (2.7).
The proof is provided in Section 7.
Remark 4.2. Our results in Theorem 4.1(i) reveal the following interesting features:
The conditional distribution for the system risk S given a claim Vj
(i) is equal to the shifted unconditional distribution of the system’s loss S,
(ii) is independent of the distinct object j,
(iii) depends only on the difference s− v of the threshold values.
In particular, (i) and (iii) display a certain “no-memory” property for the GEM
distribution class. These results also contribute to statistical theory, because such
conditional probabilities have not been investigated for GEM distributions yet. ♦
Analogously to Theorem 4.1 we obtain the complementary result:
Proposition 4.3. Under Assumptions 1 and 2 the conditional probabilities for claim
Vj, j ∈ d satisfy:
(i) for s > v > 0:
P (Vj > v | S > s) = P (Vj > v)
P (S > s | S > s− v)
= exp(−λ˜jv)
∑d
k=1 p˜ik exp(−λ˜k(s− v))∑d
k=1 p˜ik exp(−λ˜ks)
,
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and for v ≥ s > 0:
P (Vj > v | S > s) = P (Vj > v)
P (S > s)
=
exp(−λ˜jv)∑d
k=1 p˜ik exp(−λ˜ks)
;
(ii) asymptotically for x→∞ and 0 < β < 1:
P (Vj > βx | S > x) ∼ exp(−(λ˜j − ˜`)βx) = P (Vj > βx)
P (Vm˜ > βx)
,
and for β ≥ 1:
P (Vj > βx | S > x) ∼ exp(−(βλ˜j −
˜`)x)
p˜im˜
∝ P (Vj > βx)
P (Vm˜ > x)
.
Proof. The results follow from Theorem 4.1, which implies:
P (Vj > v, S > s) = P (Vj > v) · P (S > s− v) .
Remark 4.4. Proposition 4.3 shows that P (Vj > v | S > s) depends (even asymp-
totically) on index j and on the distribution of the particular claim Vj in contrast
to the previously investigated counterpart P (S > s | Vj > v). ♦
Next we state the results for the conditional densities:
Proposition 4.5. Under Assumptions 1 and 2 we obtain for the conditional density
of the system risk S:
(i) for s > v > 0:
fS|Vj>v(s) = fS(s− v) ,
(ii) asymptotically for x→∞ and 0 < β < 1:
fS|Vj>βx(x) ∼ p˜im˜fVm˜((1− β)x) = p˜im˜ ˜`exp(−(1− β)˜`x) ;
and for the conditional density of claim Vj, j ∈ d:
(iii)
fVj |S>s(v) =

fVj (v)
fS|S>s−v(s)
, for s > v > 0 ,
fVj (v)
fS(s)
, for v ≥ s > 0 ;
(iv) asymptotically for x→∞:
fVj |S>αx(x) ∼

λ˜j
˜`˜pim˜
exp(−(λ˜j − α˜`)x) , for α ∈ (0, 1] ,
λ˜j
˜`
exp(−(λ˜j − ˜`)x) , for α > 1 .
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Proof. These densities results follow from Theorem 4.1 and Proposition 4.3.
We complete the analysis of conditional probabilities for large object claims by
stating the results for individual agent’s risk.
Theorem 4.6. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the exposure Ui of agent i and claim Vj
of object j ∈M(i) have for x > 0 the following conditional distributions and asymp-
totic behavior for x→∞ (denoted by symbol “∼”):
(i) for α > ai,j:
P (Ui > αx | Vj > x) = P (Ui > (α− ai,j)x)
=
∑
k∈M(i)
pii,k exp(−(α− ai,j)λi,kx)
∼ pii,m(i) exp(−(α− ai,j)`(i)x) ;
(ii) for 0 < β < 1/ai,j:
P (Vj > βx | Ui > x) = P (Vj > βx)
P (Ui > x | Ui > (1− βai,j)x)
= exp(−λ˜jβx)
∑
k∈M(i) pii,k exp(−(1− βai,j)λi,jx)∑
k∈M(i) pii,k exp(−λi,jx)
∼ exp(−(λ˜j − ai,j`(i))βx) ;
and for β ≥ 1/ai,j:
P (Vj > βx | Ui > x) = P (Vj > βx)
P (Ui > x)
=
exp(−λ˜jβx)∑
k∈M(i) pii,k exp(−λi,jx)
∼ exp(−(βλ˜j − `(i))x)
pii,m(i)
;
and the conditional densities for x > 0:
(iii) for 0 < β < 1/ai,j:
fUi|Vj>βx(x) = fUi((1− βai,j)x) ∼ pii,m(i)`(i) exp(−(1− βai,j)x) ;
(iv)
fVj |Ui>αx(x)
=

fVj (x)
fUi(αx)
∼ λ˜j exp(−(λ˜j − α`(i))x) for 0 < α ≤ ai,j ,
fVj (x)
fUi|Ui>(α−ai,j)x(αx)
∼ λ˜j exp(−(λ˜j − `(i))x) for α > ai,j .
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Proof. The results follow analogously to the proofs of Theorem 4.1 and Proposi-
tions 4.3, 4.5, whereby here we apply Ui =
∑
k∈M(i) Xi,k with Xi,k = ai,kVk which
are stochastically independent and exponentially distributed with parameters λi,k.
Remark 4.7. We provide some economic interpretations of our findings, in partic-
ular how our results are applicable to system regulation. Theorems 4.1 and 4.6(i)
point out the following characteristic properties for financial systems with exponen-
tial claims:
The marginal distribution of the system’s loss S (or a single agent’s loss Ui) contains
all information to quantify the effect of (large) claims on the system (or individual)
risk. This holds not only asymptotically for large claims, but also exactly for all
s, v > 0: P (S > s | Vj > v) = P (S > s− v).
This “no-memory” property of the GEM distribution class leads to a substantial
simplification for system regulation. Only the marginal distribution of the system
(or individual) risk has to be known in order to quantify system (or individual)
stability with respect to stress situations caused by large claims. Thereby, it is irrel-
evant which particular object causes troubles.
The other way around, by evaluating the impact of a high system’s loss S on the dis-
tribution of a single claim Vj , we obtain that it depends specifically on the claim’s
stochastic properties and characteristic parameters. Nevertheless, in this case the
conditional distributions can be expressed via marginal ones for both S and Vj , as
Proposition 4.3 implies:
P (Vj > v | S > s) = P (Vj > v)P (S > s− v)
P (S > s)
, s, v > 0 .
The qualitative difference between P (S > s | Vj > v) and P (Vj > v | S > s)
as well as between P (Ui > u | Vj > v) and P (Vj > v | Ui > u) is based on
the following intuition: events {S > s} or {Ui > u} do not specify which object
causes which loss. Such events may comprise very different scenarios for the vector
of object claims (V1, . . . , Vd), e.g. scenarios with one or more large claims as well as
those where none of the object claims is large but S or Ui exceeds a high threshold
by a cumulation effect. ♦
5 Mutual influence of individual and system risks with
respect to portfolio diversification
In this section we deduce the conditional distribution for the system risk in case that
some agent confronts a stress situation and, conversely, the conditional distribution
of an agent’s exposure in situations of large system’s losses.
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By analogy to Theorem 4.1 and Proposition 4.3, replacing the single object claims
Vj by generically structured portfolios Ui as in (2.1) requires to compute numerous
distinct cases. Hence, we focus on homogeneous portfolios as it is common in the
literature (see e.g. Brechmann et al. [4], Geluk et al. [8], Ibragimov [10]), where the
considered agent i selects arbitrary objects for his portfolio but holds them equally
weighted, i.e.,
ai,j = a for all j ∈M(i) and some 0 < a ≤ 1 . (5.1)
We illustrate the technical results in Theorem 5.1 and Proposition 5.2 by the two
extreme portfolios (cf. Section 5.2): the concentrated portfolio (A) with |M(i)| = 1
and the totally diversified portfolio (B) with |M(i)| = d in Corollaries 5.3 to 5.6.
These allow us to quantify diversification effects in Remark 5.7 and to formulate in
Theorem 5.8 a criterion to decide whether portfolio diversification is beneficial for
individual agents with respect to a systemic crisis.
We extend our notation characterizing the objects which agent i selects or not. The
set d of all object indices is divided into the set M(i) from (2.4) of objects selected
by agent i and its complement
M(¬ i) := d \M(i) , (5.2)
which contains the objects not selected by agent i. Moreover, we define the sets
M(i\j) := M(i) \ {j} and M(¬ i∪j) := M(¬ i) ∪ {j} = d \M(i\j).
Analogously to ˜` from (2.7) we define
˜`(i) := λ˜m˜(i) := min
j∈M(i)
λ˜j and ˜`(¬ i) := λ˜m˜(¬ i) := min
j∈M(¬ i)
λ˜j , (5.3)
with ˜`(¬ i) := ∞ if M(¬ i) is empty. Extending the notion of p˜ij from (3.5) to
subsets of d, we denote the corresponding mixing proportions for j ∈ M(∗) and
∗ ∈ {i,¬ i,¬ i ∪ j} by
p˜i∗,j :=

∏
k∈M(∗)\{j}
λ˜k
λ˜k − λ˜j
for |M(∗)| > 1 ,
1 otherwise .
(5.4)
These mixing proportions satisfy
p˜ii,j · p˜i¬ i∪j,j = p˜ij for all i ∈ n, j ∈M(i) . (5.5)
5.1 Conditional results on individual and system risks
In the following theorem we state the conditional distribution of the system’s loss S
given that some agent i suffices a loss of at least u; the proof is provided in Section 7.
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Theorem 5.1. Let Assumptions 1, 2 and (5.1) hold. Then
(i) for s > u/a > 0:
P (S > s | Ui > u) =
∑
j∈M(i) p˜ii,jP (Vj > u/a)P (
∑
k∈M(¬ i∪j) Vk > s− u/a)∑
j∈M(i) p˜ii,jP (Vj > u/a)
=
∑
j∈M(i)
∑
k∈M(¬ i∪j) p˜ii,j p˜i¬ i∪j,k exp(−
λ˜j−λ˜k
a u− λ˜ks)∑
j∈M(i) p˜ii,j exp(−
λ˜j
a u)
;
(ii) asymptotically for x→∞ and α > 1/a:
P (S > αx | Ui > x) ∼ p˜i¬ i∪m˜(i),m˜ exp(−(α− 1/a)˜`x) .
Conversely, we obtain:
Proposition 5.2. Let Assumptions 1, 2 and (5.1) hold. Then
(i) for s > u/a > 0:
P (Ui > u | S > s) =
∑
j∈M(i) p˜ii,jP
(
Vj >
u
a
)
P
(∑
k∈M(¬ i∪j) Vk > s− ua
)
∑
q∈d p˜iqP (Vq > s)
=
∑
j∈M(i)
∑
k∈M(¬ i∪j) p˜ii,j p˜i¬ i∪j,k exp
(
− λ˜j−λ˜ka u− λ˜ks
)
∑
q∈d p˜iq exp(−λ˜qs)
,
and for u ≥ a s > 0:
P (Ui > u | S > s) =
∑
j∈M(i) p˜ii,jP
(
Vj >
u
a
)∑
q∈d p˜iqP (Vq > s)
=
∑
j∈M(i) p˜ii,j exp
(
− λ˜ja u
)
∑
q∈d p˜iq exp(−λ˜qs)
;
(ii) asymptotically for x→∞ and 0 < β < a:
– if ˜`(i) < ˜`(¬ i):
P (Ui > βx | S > x) → 1 ,
– if ˜`(i) > ˜`(¬ i):
P (Ui > βx | S > x) ∼
∏
j∈M(i\m˜(i))
λ˜j − ˜`(¬ i)
λ˜j − ˜`(i)
exp
(
−(˜`(i)− ˜`(¬ i))β
a
x
)
;
and for β ≥ a:
P (Ui > βx | S > x) ∼
p˜ii,m˜(i)
p˜im˜(i)
exp
(
−
(
β
a
˜`(i)− ˜`
)
x
)
.
The different cases for the asymptotic results in Proposition 5.2(ii) arise depending
on whether the dominant claim of the system (according to Theorem 3.5) with the
smallest parameter ˜` is a part of the agent’s portfolio.
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Proof. The results in Proposition 5.2 follow from Theorem 5.1, whose proof (cf. (7.4))
gives:
P (Ui > u, S > s)
=

∑
j∈M(i)
p˜ii,jP (Vj > u/a) P
( ∑
k∈M(¬ i∪j)
Vk > s− u/a
)
for s > u/a ,
∑
j∈M(i)
p˜ii,jP (Vj > u/a) for u ≥ a s .
In Theorem 5.1 and Proposition 5.2 we quantify individual and system risks by their
conditional loss distributions, which allow us to measure interdependencies within
the system. These results display the impact of different types of stress situations
such as a distressed agent or a systemic crisis and, hence, are useful for stress testing
of financial institutions (see e.g. Brechmann et al. [4]).
5.2 Analysis of diversification benefits
Portfolio selection and diversification refer to central concepts in financial risk man-
agement. We provide an assessment of possible diversification benefits by considering
two important extreme cases, cf. Ibragimov [10]:
(A) Concentrated portfolio: agent i selects only object j;
i.e., ai,j = a for some 0 < a ≤ 1, ai,k = 0 for all k ∈ d \ {j}.
(B) Totally diversified portfolio: agent i selects all objects and with the same
weights;
i.e., ai,k = a for all k ∈ d and some 0 < a ≤ 1.
For these portfolios (A) and (B) we obtain the following results in Corollaries 5.3 –
5.6 as special cases of Theorem 5.1 and Proposition 5.2.
We start with the concentrated portfolio (A) with Ui = ai,jVj which implies M(i) =
{j} and, hence, ˜`(i) = λ˜j , p˜ii,j = 1 and p˜i¬ i∪j,k = p˜ik for all k ∈ d. Then we apply
property (5.5) for the mixing proportions and obtain:
Corollary 5.3 (Concentrated portfolio). Under Assumptions 1, 2, for portfolio (A)
we find:
(i) for s > u/a > 0:
P (S > s | Ui > u) = P
(
S > s− u
a
)
=
d∑
k=1
p˜ik exp
(
−λ˜k
(
s− u
a
))
;
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(ii) asymptotically for x→∞ and α > 1/a:
P (S > αx | Ui > x) ∼ p˜im˜ exp
(
−
(
α− 1
a
)
˜`x
)
.
And complementary:
Corollary 5.4 (Concentrated portfolio). Under Assumptions 1, 2, for portfolio (A)
we find:
(i) for s > u/a > 0:
P (Ui > u | S > s) = P (Ui > u)
P
(
S > s | S > s− ua
)
=
∑d
k=1 p˜ik exp
(
− λ˜j−λ˜ka u− λ˜ks
)
∑d
k=1 p˜ik exp(−λ˜ks)
,
and for u ≥ a s > 0:
P (Ui > u | S > s) = P (Ui > u)
P (S > s)
=
exp
(
− λ˜ja u
)
∑d
k=1 p˜ik exp(−λ˜ks)
;
(ii) asymptotically for x→∞ and 0 < β < a:
– if λ˜j = mink∈d λ˜k:
P (Ui > βx | S > x) → 1 ,
– if λ˜j 6= mink∈d λ˜k:
P (Ui > βx | S > x) ∼ exp
(
−(λ˜j − ˜`)β
a
x
)
;
and for β ≥ a:
P (Ui > βx | S > x) ∼ 1
p˜ij
exp
(
−
(
β
a
λ˜j − ˜`
)
x
)
.
Next, we analyze the totally diversified portfolio (B). We obtain the following results
from Theorem 5.1 and Proposition 5.2 with Ui = a
∑d
j=1 Vj = aS which implies
M(i) = d, ˜`(i) = ˜`, p˜ii,j = p˜ij for all j ∈ d and p˜i¬ i∪j,k = 1. The set M(¬ i) (of
non-selected objects) is empty for portfolio (B), so we have ˜`(¬ i) =∞, cf. (5.3).
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Corollary 5.5 (Totally diversified portfolio). Under Assumptions 1, 2, for portfo-
lio (B) we find:
(i) for s > u/a > 0:
P (S > s | Ui > u) = P
(
S > s | S > u
a
)
=
∑d
j=1 p˜ij exp(−λ˜js)∑d
j=1 p˜ij exp
(
− λ˜ja u
) ;
(ii) asymptotically for x→∞ and α > 1/a:
P (S > αx | Ui > x) ∼ exp
(
−
(
α− 1
a
)
˜`x
)
.
And complementary:
Corollary 5.6 (Totally diversified portfolio). Under Assumptions 1, 2, for portfo-
lio (B) we find:
(i) for u ≥ a s > 0:
P (Ui > u | S > s) = P
(
S >
u
a
| S > s
)
=
∑d
j=1 p˜ij exp
(
− λ˜ja u
)
∑d
j=1 p˜ij exp(−λ˜js)
;
(ii) asymptotically for x→∞ and β ≥ a it holds:
P (Ui > βx | S > x) ∼ exp
(
−
(
β
a
− 1
)
˜`x
)
.
Our results in Corollaries 5.3 – 5.6 for the two extreme cases of portfolio selection
give interesting insights for diversification policy which are discussed in the following
Remark 5.7 and in Theorem 5.8.
Remark 5.7. The impact of an agent’s large exposure on the system risk is of
interest for system regulation. This issue has been considered in Theorem 5.1 and
Corollaries 5.3, 5.5, which show that for a homogeneous portfolio of agent i ∈ n with
weights ai,j ∈ {0, a} for 0 < a ≤ 1 the conditional probabilities for the system’s loss
are all asymptotically proportional:
P (S > αx | Ui > x) ∼ C(M(i)) exp(−(α− 1/a)˜`x) for x→∞ ,
with C(M(i)) := p˜i¬ i∪m˜(i),m˜. We find that C(M(i)) > C(M(k)) for M(i) ⊂ M(k). The
proportionality constant C(M(i)) is equal to 1 if agent i holds a totally diversified
portfolio (B) including all available objects, and increases in the number of objects
not selected by agent i up to the value p˜im˜ for the concentrated (one-object) portfo-
lio (A).
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Thus, given that a single agent’s exposure exceeds some high threshold, the probabil-
ity for a large system’s loss is higher for a smaller portfolio’s diversification degree of
the agent. This holds because, if the sum of several shared objects Ui = a
∑
j∈M(i) Vj
exceeds some high threshold, this does not require that we have large claims on sin-
gle objects, as it can be a cumulation effect. However, if a single aVj exceeds a high
threshold, it is a clear cause of a system’s loss. ♦
Next we show that for systems with exponential claims the typical recommendation
for portfolio selection has to be modified: Diversification is not always beneficial in
view of systemic crisis situations. The following theorem gives a criterion for agents
to decide whether concentration or diversification is beneficial.
Theorem 5.8. Let agent 1 hold a concentrated portfolio (A) by selecting a single
object j with weight a and agent 2 hold a totally diversified portfolio (B) by selecting
all d objects with weights a/d, respectively. In order to minimize the individual risk
with respect to situations of large system’s losses, i.e. to minimize the conditional
probability of
Pi(x) := P (Ui > βx | S > x) , β > 0, i = 1, 2
as x→∞, we deduce the following decision criterion:
Portfolio concentration (agent 1) is beneficial in contrast to diversification (agent 2)
if and only if the ratio of parameters satisfies:
λ˜j
˜`
> Qd,β , with Qd,β :=

1 for 0 < β < a/d ,
1 + d− a/β for a/d ≤ β < a ,
d for β ≥ a ,
(5.6)
where λ˜j is the parameter of object j and ˜`= mink∈d λ˜k.
Proof. Corollaries 5.4(ii) with weight a and 5.6(ii) with weight a/d imply that:
P1(x) ∼
exp(−(λ˜j − ˜`)βx/a) for 0 < β < aexp(−(βλ˜j/a− ˜`)x)/p˜ij for β ≥ a
P2(x) ∼
1 for 0 < β < a/dexp(−(βd/a− 1)˜`x) for β ≥ a/d
Consequently, we obtain:
– for 0 < β < a/d:
P1(x) = o(P2(x)) if λ˜j 6= ˜` (i.e., λ˜j > ˜`) and P1(x) ∼ P2(x) if λ˜j = ˜`;
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Figure 5.1: Log-log-plot: comparison of conditional probabilities for ten concentrated portfolios
for objects j ∈ d = {1, . . . , 10} (dashed lines) and for totally diversified portfolio (solid line) with
β = 0.4, a = 0.25: plot (a) for scenario (i) with strongly heterogeneous parameters λ˜j and plot (b)
for scenario (ii) with weakly heterogeneous parameters λ˜j ; cf. Example 5.9.
– for a/d ≤ β < a:
P1(x) = o(P2(x)) ⇔ − λ˜jβ
a
+
˜`β
a
+
βd˜`
a
− ˜`< 0 ⇔ λ˜j
˜`
> 1 + d− a
β
;
– for β ≥ a:
P1(x) = o(P2(x)) ⇔ − λ˜jβ
a
+
˜`βd
a
< 0 ⇔ λ˜j
˜`
> d .
As a consequence of Theorem 5.8, portfolio diversification is usually preferable for
agents if objects refer to similar risk classes. However, in systems with strongly
heterogeneous object claims (very different risk classes, e.g. governmental bonds
and derivative products), concentrating on few objects identified by criterion (5.6)
can be advantageous for agents in situations of large system’s losses. We demonstrate
this effect in the following example and the corresponding Figure 5.1.
Example 5.9. For a system of d = 10 objects we compare the conditional sur-
vival functions P1 for the ten portfolios concentrated each on a single object j ∈ d
and P2 for the totally diversified portfolio of all ten objects for two different sce-
narios: (i) system with strongly heterogeneous objects, (ii) system with weakly het-
erogeneous objects. In scenario (i) the claims have parameters (λ˜1, λ˜2, . . . , λ˜10) =
(0.05, 0.25, . . . 1.85) with step 0.2, in scenario (ii) they have parameters (λ˜1, λ˜2, . . . ,
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λ˜10) = (0.05, 0.75, . . . 0.275) with step 0.025. These scenarios are suitable for com-
parison as the risk-dominant parameter is ˜`= 0.05 equally for (i) and (ii).
In Figure 5.1 we plot for β = 0.4, a = 0.25 the survival functions of type P1 for ten
concentrated portfolios (dashed lines) and those of type P2 for the totally diversified
portfolio (solid line). It illustrates how our criterion in Theorem 5.8 applies: In sce-
nario (ii) the parameter ratio is λ˜j/˜`< d for all j ∈ d, and the criterion gives that
diversification is most beneficial here. In contrast, in scenario (i) it holds λ˜j/˜`> d
if and only if j ≥ 4, which implies that not diversification but concentration on
objects k ∈ {4, 5, . . . , 10} is the favorable strategy here for agents to minimize their
individual risks in case of systemic crisis situations. ♦
6 Summary and comparison of results for light and heavy
tails
In this section, we contrast our results for a system with light-tailed claims Vj ∈
EXP(λj) for j ∈ d to the earlier results under the assumption of heavy-tailed claims.
The papers of Kley et al. [15, 16] are very appropriate for a comparison as they in-
vestigate systems of the same structure. The only difference to our framework is that
the object claims are assumed to be heavy-tailed with asymptotically proportional
tail decay, in particular they have Pareto tails:
P (Vj > x) ∝ x−γ for x→∞ , (6.1)
with same parameter γ > 0 for all j ∈ d; written as Vj ∈ PAR(γ).
Our comparison addresses three issues: (I) scaling and aggregation of claims, (II) in-
dividual and system’s risks, (III) conditional distributions and diversification effects.
(I) We start by contrasting the qualitatively different behavior for exponential
EXP(λ) and for Pareto PAR(γ) claims under scaling and aggregation. In particu-
lar we underscore the different role of parameters λ and γ which both describe the
tail decay of the claims’ survival functions but act differently as scale and shape
parameters, respectively:
– Scaling with a > 0: for exponential claims the tail decay changes, for Pareto
claims it remains unchanged:
V ∈ EXP(λ) ⇒ aV ∈ EXP(λ/a) ,
V ∈ PAR(γ) ⇒ aV ∈ PAR(γ) .
– Aggregation: summing up exponential claims leads to classes of GEM or gener-
alized Erlang mixture distributions, for Pareto claims the distribution type PAR
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remains with unchanged γ:
Vi ∈ EXP(λi), i = 1, 2 ⇒ V1 + V2 ∈ GEM(λ1, λ2) ,
V1, V2 ∈ PAR(γ) ⇒ V1 + V2 ∈ PAR(γ) .
These two points also imply that in the EXP-framework we cannot restrict our
analysis to object claims with the same tail decay, as in the PAR-framework in
Kley et al. [15, 16]. They assumed PAR(γ) with same parameter γ for all object
claims because claims with larger parameter are asymptotically negligible. We have
shown that this is not the case for EXP-framework. Theorem 3.5 proves that object
claims which are asymptotically negligible for the system might be dominant ones
for some agents’ exposures. Consequently, the framework of Jiang and Tang [13]
where the claims are assumed to be independent exponentially distributed with the
same parameter λ and the aggregated risk is analyzed using the Erlang distribution
cannot be applied in our context; i.e., to systems of agents sharing claims.
(II) Next, we compare individual and system risks for both EXP-framework with
distinct parameters according to Assumption 2 and PAR-framework:
For exponential claims, we prove that the individual risk of an agent is determined
asymptotically by the dominant claim in his portfolio. The survival functions of the
agents’ exposures have generically different tail decays, and can differ from those of
the system’s loss. This means that some individual risks are asymptotically negligible
compared to others and, in particular, to the system risk. Generically it holds
P (Ui > x) = o(P (S > x)) for x→∞ ,
as we have shown in Theorem 3.5, cf. also Remark 3.6.
In contrast, for PAR-framework individual and system risks are asymptotically pro-
portional (Th. 3.2 in Kley et al. [15]):
P (Ui > x) ∼ Ci x−γ , P (S > x) ∼ CS x−γ , (6.2)
with constant Ci > 0 depending on all objects selected by agent i and constant
CS > 0 depending on all objects in the network. In contrast, for EXP-framework
only single objects determine the asymptotic tails of individual and system risks; cf.
Theorem 3.5.
(III) The impact of single object claims as in Section 4 has not been investigated
in Kley et al. [15, 16]; however, the “no-memory” property of the EXP-framework
for the conditional distribution of S (in the GEM distribution class) given some
claim Vj shown in Theorem 4.1 and Remark 4.2 does not hold for PAR. In contrast
to our results in Section 5 for the EXP-framework, Kley et al. [16, Th. 2.4, Cor.
2.5] obtain for the PAR-framework with homogeneous portfolios defined in (5.1) the
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following statements on the mutual dependence of individual and system risk for
x→∞:
P (S > αx | Ui > x) → (αa)−γ for α > 1/a , (6.3)
P (Ui > βx | S > x) →
1 for β < a(a/β)γ for β ≥ a (6.4)
Hence, for PAR-claims the conditional probabilities of individual and system risks
converge in all cases to positive limits. This shows a qualitative difference to EXP-
claims, where we have in several cases the limit value zero (see Theorem 5.1 and
Proposition 5.2). Moreover in the PAR-framework, neither the specific portfolio
structure of agent i nor the number of selected objects influences the limits in
(6.3) and (6.4). Consequently, the degree of portfolio diversification does not af-
fect these conditional distributions in the PAR-framework. This is different in the
EXP-framework, as we obtained in Corollaries 5.3 – 5.6 significant diversification
effects. These findings allow for interesting interpretations given in Remark 5.7 and
enable the formulation of a criterion in Theorem 5.8 to decide whether diversification
brings advantages to a single agent holding exponential claims in case of a systemic
crisis.
7 Proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 5.1
Proof of Theorem 4.1. For the joint probability we compute for α > 1, x > 0:
P (S > αx, Vj > x)
= P
( d∑
k=1
Vk > αx, Vj > x
)
=
∞∫
x
P
(∑
k∈d
k 6=j
Vk > αx− u | Vj = u
)
fVj (u)du
=
αx∫
x
P
(∑
k∈d
k 6=j
Vk > αx− u
)
fVj (u)du+
∞∫
αx
fVj (u)du =: I1 + I2 (7.1)
as the claims Vk are stochastically independent. The integral I2 is equal to exp(−λ˜jαx).
For the integral I1 we apply that
∑
k 6=j Vk follows a GEM distribution (analogously
to S); however, its mixing proportions do not coincide with the p˜ik from S =
∑
k∈d Vk,
instead its mixing proportions are as follows:
∏
l∈d
l6=j,l 6=k
λ˜l
λ˜l − λ˜k
, k ∈ d \ {j} . (7.2)
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Hence, dropping the summand Vj does not only reduce the number of mixing pro-
portions from d to d−1, but also changes each of the mixing proportions. We derive:
I1 =
αx∫
x
P
(∑
k∈d
k 6=j
Vk > αx− u
)
fVj (u)du
=
αx∫
x
∑
k∈d
k 6=j
∏
l∈d
l 6=j,l 6=k
λ˜l
λ˜l − λ˜k
exp(−λ˜k(αx− u))λ˜j exp(−λ˜ju)du
=
∑
k∈d
k 6=j
λ˜j
∏
l∈d
l 6=j,l 6=k
λ˜l
λ˜l − λ˜k
exp(−λ˜kαx)
αx∫
x
exp((λ˜k − λ˜j)u)du
=
∑
k∈d
k 6=j
λ˜j
λ˜k − λ˜j
∏
l∈d
l 6=j,l 6=k
λ˜l∏
l∈d
l 6=j,l 6=k
(λ˜l − λ˜k)
exp(−λ˜kαx)
·
[
exp((λ˜k − λ˜j)αx)− exp((λ˜k − λ˜j)x)
]
=
∑
k∈d
k 6=j
λ˜j
∏
l∈d
l 6=j,l 6=k
λ˜l
(λ˜k − λ˜j)
∏
l∈d
l 6=j,l 6=k
(λ˜l − λ˜k)
[
exp(−λ˜jαx)
− exp(−(λ˜j + λ˜k(α− 1))x)
]
= exp(−λ˜jx)
∑
k∈d
k 6=j
p˜ik
[
exp(−λ˜k(α− 1)x)− exp(−λ˜j(α− 1)x)
]
,
where we have used definition (3.5) in the last step. Together with (7.1) this yields
P (S > αx | Vj > x) =
∑
k∈d
k 6=j
p˜ik exp(−λ˜k(α− 1)x)
+
(
1−
∑
k∈d
k 6=j
p˜ik
)
exp(−λ˜j(α− 1)x)
=
∑
k∈d
p˜ik exp(−λ˜k(α− 1)x) = P (S > (α− 1)x) ,
where the property
∑
k∈d p˜ik = 1 from (3.3) for the mixing proportions is applied.
Asymptotically for x→∞, it holds:
P (S > αx | Vj > x) ∼ p˜im˜ exp(−(α− 1)˜`x) = p˜im˜P (Vm˜ > (α− 1)x) .
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Proof of Theorem 5.1. One could write the joint probability of S and Ui by
extending the method applied in the proof of Theorem 4.1, where in (7.1) the joint
probability of S and Vj is calculated by integration of conditional probabilities given
the claim value using the stochastic independence of Vj from the other object claims.
However, this would lead to the following non-trivial |M(i)|-dimensional integrals:
P
(
S > αx,Ui > x
)
= P (
∑
j∈d
Vj > αx,
∑
j∈M(i)
Vj > x/a)
=
∫
· · ·
∫
vj≥0,j∈M(i)
with
∑
vj >x/a
P
(∑
j∈d
Vj > αx | Vj = vj , j ∈M(i)
) · ∏
j∈M(i)
(fVj (vj) dvj)
=
∫
· · ·
∫
vj≥0,j∈M(i)
with x/a<
∑
vj <αx
P (
∑
k∈M(¬ i)
Vk > αx−
∑
j∈M(i)
vj) ·
∏
j∈M(i)
(fVj (vj) dvj)
+
∫
· · ·
∫
vj≥0,j∈M(i)
with
∑
vj >αx
∏
j∈M(i)
(fVj (vj) dvj) .
To avoid this multi-dimensional integration over all combinations for the elements
of (vj)j∈M(i) ∈ [0,∞)|M(i)| where their sum
∑
j(vj) lays in some distinct interval, we
propose the following idea. We introduce the random variables
Wi := Ui/a =
∑
j∈M(i)
Vj and W i := S −Wi =
∑
k∈M(¬ i)
Vj .
Then we apply the portfolio homogeneity condition (5.1) and exploit that Wi, W i are
stochastically independent where Wi follows a GEM distribution with parameters λ˜j
and mixing proportions p˜ii,j for j ∈ M(i), and W i follows a GEM distribution with
parameters λ˜k and mixing proportions p˜i¬ i,k for k ∈M(¬ i), cf. (5.4).
For α > 1/a we obtain:
P (S > αx,Ui > x) = P
( d∑
j=1
Vj > αx,Wi > x/a
)
=
αx∫
x/a
P (W i > αx− u)fWi(u)du+
∞∫
αx
fWi(u)du
=
∑
j∈M(i)
∑
k∈M(¬ i)
λ˜j p˜ii,j p˜i¬ i,k exp(−λ˜kαx)
αx∫
x/a
exp((λ˜k − λ˜j)u)du
+
∑
j∈M(i)
p˜ii,j exp(−λ˜jαx)
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=
∑
j∈M(i)
∑
k∈M(¬ i)
λ˜j p˜ii,j p˜i¬ i,k
λ˜k − λ˜j
[
exp(−λ˜jαx)− exp
(− (λ˜j/a+ (α− 1/a)λ˜k)x)]
+
∑
j∈M(i)
p˜ii,j exp(−λ˜jαx)
=
∑
j∈M(i)
p˜ii,j
(
1 +
∑
k∈M(¬ i)
λ˜j p˜i¬ i,k
λ˜k − λ˜j
)
exp(−λ˜jαx)
−
∑
j∈M(i)
∑
k∈M(¬ i)
λ˜j p˜ii,j p˜i¬ i,k
λ˜k − λ˜j
exp
(− (λ˜j/a+ (α− 1/a)λ˜k)x) .
Applying the mixing proportions property (according to (3.3)):
1 +
∑
k∈M(¬ i)
λ˜j p˜i¬ i,k
λ˜k − λ˜j
= 1−
∑
k∈M(¬ i)
p˜i¬ i∪j,k = p˜i¬ i∪j,j
yields:
P (S > αx,Ui > x)
=
∑
j∈M(i)
p˜ii,j exp(−λ˜jx/a)
[
p˜i¬ i∪j,j exp(−λ˜j(α− 1/a)x)
−
∑
k∈M(¬ i)
λ˜j p˜i¬ i,k
λ˜k − λ˜j
exp
(− λ˜k(α− 1/a)x)]
=
∑
j∈M(i)
p˜ii,j exp(−λ˜jx/a)
∑
k∈M(¬ i∪j)
p˜i¬ i∪j,k exp
(− λ˜k(α− 1/a)x) (7.3)
=
∑
j∈M(i)
p˜ii,jP (Vj > x/a)P (W i + Vj > (α− 1/a)x) (7.4)
Consequently, we obtain:
P (S > αx | Ui > x) =
∑
j∈M(i) p˜ii,jP (Vj > x/a)P (W i + Vj > (α− 1/a)x)∑
j∈M(i) p˜ii,jP (Vj > x/a)
.
Asymptotically for x → ∞ in (7.3) the summands with j = m˜(i) and
k = min(m˜(¬i), m˜(i)) = m˜ dominate, such that we have:
P (S > αx | Ui > x) ∼ p˜i¬ i∪m˜(i),m˜ exp(−(α− 1/a)˜`x) .
This gives the result for α > 1/a; for α ≤ 1/a we simply have P (S > αx,Ui > x) =
P (Wi > x/a) and, hence, P (S > αx | Ui > x) = 1.
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